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PROPERTY’S MEMORIES 
Eduardo M. Peñalver*
INTRODUCTION 
 
My grandmother spent the last forty years of her life longing for the 
modest, middle class home on Calle Concordia in central Havana that she 
had not seen in decades.  Dementia at last robbed her of the power even to 
recall what she had lost.  But in her senility, she still showed the scars of 
revolution.  Until her death in 2003, she quietly hoarded any household 
items she could manage to squirrel away.  Tubes of toothpaste, disposable 
razors, and pouches of artificial sweetener disappeared by the dozens into 
the drawers and cupboards of her bedroom.  The story of my grandmother’s 
loss and longing could be told thousands of times over by other Cubans of 
her generation who left behind their homes and possessions to come to the 
United States, as the Cuban-American saying goes, with nothing but “una 
mano adelante y otra atraz.”1
No one does nostalgia like Cuban-Americans.  The Cubans who left the 
island in the years after Castro’s rise to power have made it their own 
special emotion, what Ricardo Ortiz has called their “most profound 
psychic addiction.”
 
2
Although the phenomenon is obviously complex, a significant dimension 
of Cuban-American nostalgia is connected with property.  Most obviously, 
their nostalgia feeds on the homes and landed estates many Cubans left 
behind with every intention of returning when Castro’s government fell, as 
they thought it surely must within a year or two.  For many, the passage of 
fifty years has dampened neither the certainty of, nor the fervent hope for, 
the regime’s imminent departure.  But Cuban-American nostalgia also 
derives its power, almost as painfully, from boxes of family photos, 
childhood toys, and keepsakes that remained behind because, as every 
  Latinos from other countries will often tell you, at 
least when Cubans are not around, that Cubans are the “Jews of the 
Caribbean.”  And so it is perhaps no accident that Cuban-Americans ring in 
the New Year with a very Jewish toast:  “Next year in Havana.” 
 
* Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.  Special thanks to Nomi Stolzenberg, Ravit 
Reichman and participants in the Conference on Law and Memory at USC for inspiring and 
motivating me to develop thoughts that had been kicking around in my head for some time.  
Thanks also to Greg Alexander and participants in Fordham Law School’s conference on the 
social function of property for many helpful comments and suggestions. 
 1. Literally:  “One hand in front and the other behind” (to hide one’s nakedness). 
 2. Ricardo L. Ortiz, Café, Culpa and Capital:  Nostalgic Addictions of Cuban Exile, 10 
YALE J. CRITICISM 63, 73 (1997). 
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Cuban-American child has been told hundreds of times since, departing 
exiles were only allowed to carry with them a single suitcase of belongings. 
The property Cubans unwillingly left behind is just part the story.  The 
flip side is the important role that property, or, more accurately, property 
distribution, played in sparking the revolution that drove them away.  
Again, while obviously more complex than any one causal explanation can 
capture, the upheaval that has ultimately resulted in fifty years of Castroism 
was due as much to the perceived injustice of unevenly distributed 
property—especially (but not exclusively) land—as to any other single 
factor.3  The progressive 1940 Cuban Constitution, which formed one of the 
inspirations of the anti-Batista movement, called for the breakup of land 
oligopoly and the redistribution of agricultural lands.4  While the 1940 
Constitution’s social democratic vision was subsequently abandoned by the 
Castro government in favor of a more radical, Stalinist model, it is no 
coincidence that one of the first acts of the Castro regime upon taking 
power was the enactment of agrarian land reform.5
Despite my focus on the topic in this introduction, this is not a paper 
about the Cuban Revolution, or even about the penchant of Cuban exiles to 
engage in the most extravagant public displays of nostalgia.  Nevertheless, 
the various facets of the Cuban experience shed light on the complex 
structure of property’s memory, or, more accurately, property’s memories. 
 
At the most basic level, the Cuban experience helps to reveal a 
distinction between two fundamentally different orientations within the 
relationship between property and memory.  The nostalgia of exiles for 
property long since lost exemplifies the continuing power of our memories 
of property.  As I argue in Part I, memory of property can itself be broken 
down into various kinds, depending on the nature of the subject and object 
of the memory.  And, where memory of property diverges from formal title 
or possession, the law must somehow mediate between the conflicting 
claims or even conflicting memories.  In Part II, I explore the notion of 
memory in property.  Like memory of property, memory “stored” in 
property can be individual or plural, both in its subject and in its object.  
The ossification of property maldistribution that helped to feed the Castro 
revolution exemplifies communal memory embedded within a system of 
property.  As with memories of property, memory embedded in property is 
a normatively ambiguous phenomenon.  It serves important social 
functions, but at a cost.  And the law treats memory embedded in property 
with a distinct ambivalence.  Finally, in Part III, I briefly discuss three areas 
 
 3. See generally LOUIS A. PÉREZ, JR., CUBA:  BETWEEN REFORM AND REVOLUTION (3d 
ed. 1988); RAMON EDUARDO RUIZ, CUBA:  THE MAKING OF A REVOLUTION (1968). 
 4. CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPUBLICA DE CUBA (1940) art. 90, translated in AMOS J. 
PEASLEE, 1 CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS 526, 541 (1st ed. 1950) (“Large landholdings 
[latifundia] are proscribed, and to do away with them the maximum amount of land that each 
person or entity can have, for each kind of exploitation to which land is devoted, and bearing 
in mind the respective peculiarities, shall be specified by law.”). 
 5. See Eduardo Moisés Peñalver, Redistributing Property:  Natural Law, International 
Norms and the Property Reforms of the Cuban Revolution, 52 FLA. L. REV. 107, 122–26 
(2000). 
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where contemporary lawmakers are attempting to privilege past memory in 
ways that depart from the common law’s more balanced approach. 
I.  MEMORIES OF PROPERTY 
Memory of property is probably what first springs to mind when the two 
constituent concepts are juxtaposed.  It was the memory of specific items of 
physical property that most powerfully characterized my grandmother’s life 
after the Cuban Revolution and that continues to fuel the powerful nostalgia 
of Cuban exile culture.  But there is another, less individualized dimension 
of memory of property:  the memory of past distributions of property.  In 
this part, I will discuss both of these in turn, spending a little more time on 
the memory of property distributions, which has received less attention than 
the connection between individual people and specific things. 
The importance of individual memory of individual items of property is 
both obvious and much discussed in academic property circles.  To use 
Holmes’s evocative image, individual items of property take root in human 
beings over time.6  This tendency generates what Joseph Singer has called a 
powerful “reliance interest” that gradually builds up in long-standing 
property relationships.7  This temporal reliance interest can be formed by 
owners and non-owners alike, and both will often seek to preserve the status 
quo on which they have come to depend.  In recognition of this 
phenomenon, when other factors are in equipoise, property law reflexively 
favors those who are first in time, perhaps with the idea that the person with 
the longer standing connection to the property has formed the more 
powerful memories.8
But property supplements these first-in-time rules with mechanisms for 
divesting original owners of their property when confronted with claims by 
those whose memories of the property are more immediate.  Doctrines as 
diverse as rent control, adverse possession, and prescription provide legal 
protection to long-established land uses of individual items of property, 
even those that were initially illegal.
 
9
In addition to the sorts of individual memories of property that I have 
been discussing, the memory of property has a powerful social dimension.  
When entire communities remember property they have lost, the memories 
reinforce one another, allowing them to persist over multiple generations.  
Conflicts surrounding ownership of antiquities reflect this connection 
between the collective memory of (lost) property and cultural identity.
 
10
 
 6. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 477 
(1897). 
  
The pressure for colonial powers to return pillaged antiquities to their 
 7. Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 622 
(1988). 
 8. See Eduardo Moisés Peñalver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property Outlaws, 155 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1095, 1134–35 (2007). 
 9. See Singer, supra note 7, at 663–701. 
 10. The relationship between cultural property and identity has sparked an enormous 
output of academic literature. See generally, Kristin A. Carpenter, Sonia K. Katyal & Angela 
R. Riley, In Defense of Property, 118 YALE L.J. 1022 (2009) (surveying the literature). 
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places of origin, generations after they were first taken, shows the resilience 
of the shared memories of property.  The case of the Elgin Marbles11 is an 
obvious example, as is the (more successful) pressure for Yale University to 
return Incan artifacts to Peru.12  The Native American Graves Protection 
and Repatriation Act of 1990 (NAGPRA) also seems to recognize this link 
between memory of property and cultural identity, requiring museums to 
return cultural objects to tribes who can show that the objects were once 
owned by members of the tribe, unless the museums can demonstrate that 
they acquired the property in a voluntary transaction with someone who 
was empowered to convey it.13
Complementing this more familiar phenomenon of the collective 
memory of cultural property, there is a distributional component to memory 
of property that has received far less attention in discussions of property 
and memory.  To return to the example of my grandmother, part of her 
nostalgia was for specific items of property lost or left behind in Cuba, but 
part of it was also a lament for ownership of property in a more aggregated 
and relative sense (i.e., wealth and the status it conferred).  Her loss in this 
regard was far more modest than some.  She did not fall from a lofty elite, 
but her exile from Cuba meant the exchange of middle class comfort for the 
life of a working class Latina in the United States.  As much as she pined 
for her house on Calle Concordia, she longed perhaps even more for her 
lost social status.  In this collective, distributive dimension, the memory of 
lost property can form the foundation for extremely stable social identities 
built around the shared experience of loss, a dynamic that is powerfully on 
display in the case of Cuban-Americans and other exile cultures. 
 
Both individual and, even more so, collective memories of property 
distributions are a powerful social force that can either reinforce the status 
quo or be radically subversive.  Where the memory (or, perhaps more 
accurately in this context, consciousness) of property distribution 
corresponds to the existing social reality, the act of remembering reinforces 
that reality.  Sumptuary laws, codifications of who can own (or, more 
accurately, use) certain kinds of property—clothing, swords, horses, etc.—
have played precisely this role in many societies since ancient times.14  In 
colonial Latin America, sumptuary laws often legally excluded those who 
were of mixed race “from holding public office, owning property, and 
adopting elite forms of transport and dress.”15
 
 11. See Michael Kimmelman, Who Draws the Borders of Culture?  Greece’s Claim for 
the Elgin Marbles Is as Much About Nationalism as About Art, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2010, at 
AR1. 
 
 12. See Randy Kennedy, Yale and Peruvian Officials Agree on Return of Artifacts, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 17, 2007, at E3. 
 13. See Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. § 3005 
(2006). 
 14. See Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV. L. 
REV. 809, 810–18 (2010) (surveying various sumptuary codes and collecting sources). 
 15. Ann Laura Stoler, Tense and Tender Ties:  The Politics of Comparison in North 
American History and (Post) Colonial Studies, 88 J. AM. HIST. 829, 836 (2001). 
2011] PROPERTY’S MEMORIES 1075 
On the other hand, where memory of property departs from the present 
distributive reality, it can delegitimize the present reality or provide a 
source of utopian inspiration.  An obvious example is provided by the 
Diggers, whose memory of an earlier system of communal landownership 
in England inspired their resistance to private landownership in their own 
time.16  A similar utopian dynamic surrounds the biblical concept of the 
Jubilee Year.  According to the book of Leviticus, every forty-ninth year, 
ancestral property was to be returned to the descendants of those who had 
originally owned it.17  In a society in which land was a primary form of 
wealth, this resetting of the property regime every few generations would 
constitute a radical redistribution, most likely in an egalitarian direction.  
Although biblical scholars generally believe that the injunction to restore 
property was never actually carried out, the mere act of remembering the 
injunction likely exerted an egalitarian influence on Israelite property 
thought.18
In law, the relevance of memory of property is almost always rooted in 
loss, or at least in the threat of loss.  Where possession, title, and memory 
all coincide, the need for legal intervention is minimal.  Legal protection 
under these circumstances helps property to accomplish many of its goals, 
both in terms of encouraging productive behavior and fostering the kinds of 
stable connections between people and things that help people make life 
plans.  But it is when someone’s memory of property conflicts with present 
possession or formal title that the power of law is most likely to be invoked.  
And when that happens, the law is asked to mediate, not just between 
memory, on the one hand, and possession or title, on the other, but often 
between competing memories of the same item of property. 
 
Conflicts fought on the terrain of memory of ownership (or memory of 
past possession) of physical items of property present thorny dilemmas for 
the law of property.  Property’s tangibility means that, at least for a great 
many uses and things, allocations of property rights create a clear hierarchy 
among potential claimants.  This is not to deny the possibility of sharing, 
particularly where a resource—like land—is susceptible to a number of 
complementary simultaneous uses.  But even where sharing is possible, a 
system of private ownership must identify a single owner (whether an 
individual or an institution) as having priority in certain respects.19
Memory, on the one hand, and possession or ownership, on the other, can 
diverge in at least three ways.  First, a person can have a memory of 
property that she has voluntarily relinquished.  If that memory causes her to 
attempt to reassert ownership rights over the thing against a subsequent 
 
 
 16. See, e.g., GEORGE M. SHULMAN, RADICALISM AND REVERENCE:  THE POLITICAL 
THOUGHT OF GERRARD WINSTANLEY 1–5 (1989). 
 17. See Leviticus 25:8–17. 
 18. See generally MADELINE KOCHEN, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE IN TALMUDIC LAW 
(forthcoming 2012) (book manuscript on file with author). 
 19. Cf. Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 
275, 275 (2008) (arguing that the “central concern” of the concept of ownership in property 
law “is not the exclusion of all non-owners from the owned thing but, rather, the 
preservation of the owner’s position as the exclusive agenda setter for the owned thing”). 
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possessor, the law of abandonment will block her, privileging the present 
possessor.20
Alternatively, a person can retain memories of property she has lost, 
either by neglect or accident or because she has been (legally or illegally) 
dispossessed by someone else.  Conversely, the person currently in 
possession of that property—such as a squatter or a mistaken possessor—
will have begun to form her own memories of the dispossessed property, 
which she does not formally own.  When memory and possession (or 
formal title) diverge in this way, the law is faced with a choice of whether 
to honor the memories associated with present possession or those rooted in 
past possession accompanied by formal title.  The law of property has 
developed an intricate web of doctrines for navigating these recurrent 
conflicts.  I will mention just a few of the most obviously relevant: 
  In these cases, the owner’s intent to abandon the property 
signals that she places little or no value on possession and, consequently, 
that her later assertion of value in the memory of the property is not 
plausible or at least entitled to less deference than the claims of the current 
possessor. 
Adverse Possession and Prescription.  The doctrine that most obviously 
attempts to balance competing memories of property is adverse possession 
(and the related doctrine of prescription).  With the passage of sufficient 
time, the law concludes that the present possessor or user has a superior 
claim, even as against the formal owner.21  Although the doctrine can draw 
support from multiple normative theories, the role of memory of property is 
crucial.  The connection is made most explicit in the original formulation 
for the statutory adverse possession period as ratifying possession that has 
existed since time immemorial or, later, when “the memory of man runneth 
not to the contrary.”22  Taken literally, the statute accomplished nothing 
since, if there really were no memory to the contrary, there could not 
possibly be a dispute about rightful possession.  The law gained its teeth 
from its legal limitation of the scope of “memory” to some particular event 
in the past—originally (according to the First Statute of Westminster 
(1275)), the beginning of the reign of Richard I (1189).23
 
 20. See Eduardo M. Peñalver, The Illusory Right to Abandon, 109 MICH. L. REV. 191, 
196 (2011).  As I have argued elsewhere, the common law does not empower owners to 
easily sever their ties of ownership to property.  For example, they cannot unilaterally 
abandon possessory interests in land.  And, because all land is owned, it is virtually 
impossible, as a practical matter, to abandon ownership of chattels.  The practical absence of 
such a mechanism strengthens owners’ bonds to property and reinforces the formation of 
memory. See generally id. But see Lior Jacobs Strahilevitz, The Right to Abandon, 158 U. 
PA. L. REV. 355 (2010). 
  This real work of 
the statute in preferring certain memories over others was made even more 
 21. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW 140–41 (3d ed. 2010). 
 22. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *76; PETER LINEBAUGH, THE MAGNA 
CARTA MANIFESTO:  LIBERTIES AND COMMONS FOR ALL 165 (2008) (quoting JOSHUA 
WILLIAMS, RIGHTS OF COMMON AND OTHER PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHTS:  BEING TWENTY-FOUR 
LECTURES DELIVERED IN GRAY’S INN HALL IN THE YEAR 1877, at 186 (1880)). 
 23. 16 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 91.01 (Michael Allan Wolf 
ed., 2000) (citing Statute of Westminster I, 1275, 3 Edward I, c. 39 (Eng.); Henry W. 
Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, 32 HARV. L. REV. 135, 137 (1918)). 
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explicit, for the first time in 1540, when the formulation based on the 
absence of contrary memory was replaced with a specified period of time.24
By failing to challenge the adverse possessor’s use of his property for the 
statutory period (in modern statutes typically seven to ten years), the 
original owner provides powerful evidence that he does not have (perhaps 
no longer has, perhaps never really had) much actual memory invested in 
the property.  By contrast, the possessor’s continuous use of the property 
for the statutory period means that she has built up a steady stream of more 
recent memories in the property.  An interesting puzzle in this regard is that 
the law generally makes it much easier to adversely possess land than 
chattels.
 
25
Lost Property.  When property is lost, the common law always awards it 
to the original owner, provided he can track it down and assert his claim.
  This difference may be more apparent than real, however, for 
reasons that I will discuss in connection with lost property. 
26  
Unless a finder is able to assert a successful claim for adverse possession 
(which is extremely difficult to do), the original owner will prevail, even 
after long periods of time.27  On its face, the doctrine makes no effort to 
actively mediate based on the strength of owners’ and possessors’ 
memories of the property.  But in reality, where the owner’s memory is 
sufficiently distant, the difficulty of tracing the location of a lost chattel 
increases with time in ways that may make this problem largely take care of 
itself.  This is less true with respect to chattels that are extremely unique or 
valuable, such as works of art.28  But for the lion’s share of lost chattels, the 
original owner’s efforts to relocate the item will likely fade within a matter 
of months of the loss.29
Accession.  Where a non-owner innocently and dramatically transforms a 
chattel he does not own, such that the bulk of its value lies in the 
improvement rather than the original raw material, the law will shift 
entitlement to possess the finished product to the innocent improver, though 
it also imposes on that improver an obligation to compensate the original 
owner.
 
30
 
 24. See id. (citing 1540, 32 Hen. VIII, c. 2, § 3 (Eng.)). 
  From the standpoint of memory of property, the principle at work 
would be described as the transformation of the original item such that it is 
no longer properly the object of the original owner’s memory.  It is as if the 
original object has been destroyed and a new item has taken its place.  The 
law recognizes the improver’s interest as more immediately worthy of 
 25. See SINGER supra note 21, at 171–73. 
 26. See id. at 800. 
 27. See id. at 171–73, 800. 
 28. See, e.g., O’Keefe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862 (N.J. 1980). 
 29. This appears to be the assumption behind many “lost property” statutes, which 
frequently require finders to deposit found property over a certain value with the police for a 
specified period of time.  In New York, for example, property worth more than $100 but less 
than $500 must be deposited with the police for six months, whereas property worth more 
than $5,000 must be left with the police for a period of three years. See N.Y. PERS. PROP. 
LAW § 253 (McKinney 1992). 
 30. See SINGER, supra note 21, at 810. 
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recognition, but it honors the owner’s memory of the original item in an 
indirect way by requiring compensation for its value. 
The pattern that unites these doctrines is an initial tendency to favor 
memories of property rooted in past possession and formal title.  Once those 
memories have become sufficiently attenuated (either temporally or, in the 
case of accession, by the transformation of the object of the memory into a 
new thing), however, the law shifts the legal entitlement in favor of present 
possession.  The law’s message to owners of long lost property is:  move 
on. 
Finally, it is possible for non-owners to have memories of property that 
they have neither owned nor possessed, property that is still very much in 
the possession of its formal owner.  Places open to the public are 
particularly susceptible to this phenomenon.  In 1963, the Pennsylvania 
Railroad tore down the original Penn Station, which it owned.  The New 
York Times described the station’s destruction as a “monumental act of 
vandalism,” and it decried the “profit motivation” that lay behind it.31  
Other observers have called Penn Station an “American treasure,” 
something that “belonged to everybody,” like the Grand Canyon.32  As was 
the case with Penn Station, the public’s memories of certain properties 
(often held in private hands) can generate feelings of ownership over 
property formally owned and possessed by another.  And it is the desire to 
avoid the feelings of loss rooted in shared memories of someone else’s 
property that constitutes the foundation for the enactment of historic 
preservation statutes.  Some owners chafe under the restrictions and 
obligations imposed by historic landmark designation, which go well 
beyond what the common law would have imposed on them.33  Although 
the Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of landmark designations 
in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,34 they remain 
controversial.35
II.  MEMORIES IN PROPERTY 
 
With memory of property it is human minds, individually and 
collectively, that do the work of remembering.  With memory in property, 
property itself, individually and collectively, stores the memory.  In calling 
this second category memory in property (or perhaps, property’s memory), 
 
 31. At the same time, it cast scorn on New York’s “politicians, philanthropists and 
planners” and even “the public.” Editorial, Farewell to Penn Station, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 
1963, at 38.  “A rich and powerful city,” it observed, “noted for its resources of brains, 
imagination and money, could not rise to the occasion.” Id. 
 32. NEW YORK:  A DOCUMENTARY FILM, THE CITY AND THE WORLD:  EPISODE 7:  1945 
TO PRESENT (PBS 1999). 
 33. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS:  CASES AND 
MATERIALS 500 (3d ed. 2005) (observing that “[a]n owner who finds landmarking 
burdensome may respond in a socially destructive manner” and citing examples). 
 34. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 35. See Gregory S. Alexander, The Social Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 
94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 791–96 (2009) (referring to the Penn Central decision as 
“controversial” and offering a defense). 
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I do not mean to fetishize property or deny the role of human agency in 
creating and interpreting the memories embedded in property.  To say that, 
for example, a USB drive stores memory is not to deny that human beings 
created the drive as a medium of memory, inserted the individual memories 
it stores, and, when they access the memories stored in the physical 
substrate of the drive, give life to them.  Nor, as will become apparent, do I 
mean to suggest that human beings are powerless to affect the degree to 
which property effectively stores the memories human beings put into it.  
Indeed, the degree to which property is able to serve as a vehicle of memory 
storage constitutes one of the most important areas of policy discussion 
concerning the design of property institutions.  But treating property as a 
kind of medium of memory that is external to human minds captures an 
important dimension of how property and memory interact. 
Like memory of property, memory in property comes in different forms 
depending on whether our focus is on individual items of property (which I 
will refer to as “physical memory”) or a system of property collectively 
(“distributive memory”).  The distinction here is drawn, again, on the basis 
of the object on which memory operates, not the nature of memory itself.  
Thus, as we will see, the mechanisms by which memory is embedded in the 
physical structure of individual items of property will be dramatically 
influenced and reinforced by undeniably collective phenomena, such as 
neighborhood effects. 
A.  Physical Memory 
The idea of the physical inscription of memory within items of property 
should be familiar to everyone.  After all, a book or a diary (or a USB drive 
or a hard disk) is nothing if not an item of personal property that has been 
physically altered in order to store memory.  Although this process of 
embedding memory on the physical structure of an object is the foundation 
of written culture, and even predates it,36
Memory can also become embedded in property less self-consciously and 
even without any intention on the part of the person forming the memory.  
An old comfortable chair or a well-broken-in baseball glove retains the 
imprint of its user in a very visible and personal way.  The nicks and 
 we often take it for granted and 
very likely underestimate the breadth of its operation.  It certainly extends 
well beyond the boundary of the kind of intentional linguistic inscription at 
work in the process of, say, writing a book.  The collection of mementos, 
for example, is an important form of memory in property. 
 
 36. I have in mind the use of mnemonics in preliterate cultures.  The Incas, for example, 
famously used knotted threads, known as quipus, for this purpose. See generally Cyrus L. 
Day, Knots and Knot Lore:  Quipus and Other Mnemonic Knots, 16 W. FOLKLORE 8 (1957).  
New England Indians used an interesting device known as “memory holes” to assist them in 
remembering significant events. NATHANIEL PHILBRICK, MAYFLOWER 105 (2006).  According 
to Philbrick, the Pokanokets dug “circular foot-deep holes in the ground” wherever “any 
remarkable act” had occurred. Id.  These holes were part memorial, part time capsule.  “It 
was each person’s responsibility to maintain the holes and to inform fellow travelers of what 
had once happened at that particular place so that many things of great antiquity are fresh in 
memory.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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scratches on a piece of antique furniture, though less specific in the message 
they convey, remind us of the life the item has seen and therefore add 
character and value.  Even unused and unweathered, the mere survival of an 
item of personal property houses a wealth of information about our past:  
forgotten fads, technologies, practices, embodied in an item of personal 
property.  This connection between cultural memory and the most everyday 
items of personal property is the insight behind museum collections. 
An interesting question in this regard concerns the increasing number of 
cultural artifacts that exist primarily, and in many cases exclusively, in 
digital form:  digital photographs, outdated (or vintage, depending on your 
point of view) video games, and digitized out of print books, just to name a 
few.  Archiving these “antiques” in a usable form will be an increasing—
and important—challenge in years ahead, unless our culture is to lose a 
great deal of its ability to decipher its own memories. 
The possibility of losing our power to interpret the information stored in 
the artifacts around us points towards the potential for memory in property 
to become latent or unconscious.  In a sense, the information is still there, if 
only we (or some trained expert) can recognize it.  There is an interesting 
interplay in this regard between the memory of property and memory stored 
in property, particularly in the case of cultural property.  The unearthing of 
a previously unknown Native American gravesite, for example, which we 
can think of as the discovery of a latent memory stored in property, can, 
once interpreted, create new content for a tribe’s collective memories of lost 
property. 
My focus to this point has been on the storage of memory in artifacts of 
personal property.  But, as I have argued elsewhere, land also has a 
powerful memory.37
Physically, land’s memory is as variable as the land itself.  Some land is 
so dynamic that its human imprint can be maintained only by constant 
effort.  Left to its own devices, the continuously advancing and retreating 
sandy seashore is likely to undermine all but the most tenaciously 
constructed “improvements.”  Very often, however, land is sufficiently 
stable that human transformations will remain in place almost indefinitely 
unless human beings actively restore the land to its prior form.  When this is 
the case, the changes to the landscape made by prior owners can qualify and 
constrain present decision making in dramatic ways. 
  Changes that human beings make to the land have a 
tendency to remain in place until they are affirmatively removed.  And 
because the quantity of land is fixed, we are fated to live our lives within a 
landscape that bears the indelible imprint of our forebears, even if we do not 
always recognize that imprint for what it is. 
To the extent that the memories of a living human being are invested in a 
particular parcel of land, it will reinforce land’s tendency to serve as a 
medium of memory.  The physical and psychological tenacity of our 
impacts on the land, however, is not the entire story of land’s memory.  The 
inertial power of individual land uses is powerfully reinforced by their 
 
 37. See Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 853–56 (2009). 
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collective interdependence.  Once in place, land uses presuppose and 
reinforce one another in ways that make it difficult to undo one piece 
without affecting many others.38  A single house, considered in isolation, is 
only as stable as its owner, but a neighborhood of homes, businesses, clubs, 
and churches constitutes an interlocking and interdependent network of 
relationships and commitments that is, collectively, exponentially more 
durable than each of its constituent parts.39
The interplay of these physical, psychological, and social components of 
land’s memory yields a powerful path-dependence in land use.  After it has 
been built, a highway cannot be shifted without doing significant harm to 
the numerous businesses and homeowners who have come to depend on it 
for access to their properties.  A city founded in a particular location to take 
advantage of access to waterborne transportation will remain in the same 
place long after its locational advantages have been dissipated by cultural 
change or technological advance.
 
40
The stability of land use makes it a logical target for the intentional 
inscription of our most important cultural memories.  The act of burying 
bodies and building monuments (often over dead bodies) is a testament to 
our faith in the stability of land’s memory.  And land’s memory is often 
harnessed to work in concert with the memory stored in chattels, as 
exemplified by the practice of burying “time capsules” in the ground or 
under public buildings. 
  Similarly, sprawled out, low density 
residential neighborhoods built around automobile use and cheap gasoline 
will be extremely difficult to dislodge once fuel becomes expensive or the 
technology of personal transportation shifts away from the car.  The 
constellations of land uses we confront today are the consequences of 
countless decisions made decades (even generations) ago, and the decisions 
we make today will reverberate through the same mechanisms far into the 
future. 
B.  Distributive Memory 
The notion that land or personal property physically embed human 
memories, whether intentionally or not, is probably obvious to most people.  
What may be less intuitive is the way allocations of property among human 
beings constitute a form of collective memory that is transmitted from one 
generation to the next.  Where one’s ranking in terms of relative property 
allocation significantly determines the property allocation for a subsequent 
generation, we can understand the relative distribution itself as a form of 
social memory written into the system of property.  This distributive 
dimension to memory in property is easiest to see in a feudal system, where 
relative property allocations are extremely (and intentionally) sticky.  But it 
also operates in a modern capitalist economy like our own. 
 
 38. See DOUGLAS W. RAE, CITY:  URBANISM AND ITS END 41 (2003); William A. Fischel, 
Why Are There NIMBYs?, 77 LAND ECON. 144, 150 (2001). 
 39. See JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 143–77 (1961). 
 40. See RAE, supra note 38, at 42–72. 
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It is important to keep the stickiness of relative property distribution (so 
called “relative mobility”) distinct from two similar phenomena:  property 
inequality and rising standards of living (or what some have called 
“absolute mobility”).41  The mobility of relative property distribution 
focuses on the degree to which one’s relative ranking in terms of share of 
total income or wealth at time T1 predicts one’s ranking (or, perhaps more 
importantly, the ranking of one’s children) at some later time.42
Although the mythology of the United States embraces a powerful belief 
in the almost limitless possibility of social mobility, the reality is 
significantly less dynamic for most Americans, particularly those at the top 
and the bottom.  Numerous recent studies have observed that relative social 
mobility in the United States lags well behind mobility in several Western 
European countries.
  The very 
ability of the institution of property to protect individual possession over 
time reflects this kind of memory in action.  The stickiness of a property 
distribution could operate through a number of mechanisms.  For example, 
restraints on the alienation of real property might lead to enormous stability 
in the allocation of land from one generation to the next.  Alternatively, the 
possession of a great deal of property at one point in time might, depending 
on background social institutions, make it easier for parents to pass 
competitive advantages on to their children.  No matter what the 
mechanism, where relative mobility is low, the property distribution at any 
one point in time becomes a kind of social fixed point. 
43  According to one 2008 Brookings study, for 
example, “it is fairly hard for children born in the bottom fifth to escape 
from the bottom:  42 percent remain there and another 42 percent end up 
either in the lower-middle or middle fifth.”44  On the other end of the 
spectrum, the Brookings study found that 39 percent of those born in the 
top quintile remain there, with an additional 23 percent landing in the 
second highest quintile.45  In the United States, about half of parental 
relative earnings advantages are passed onto children, meaning that it takes 
roughly six generations for exceptional advantages of birth to dissipate.46  
In contrast, in higher mobility countries (such as Canada, Norway, Finland, 
and Denmark) less than 20 percent of parental advantages are passed onto 
children.47
 
 41. See Isabel V. Sawhill, Overview to Julia B. Isaacs et al., Getting Ahead or Losing 
Ground:  Economic Mobility in America, BROOKINGS INST. 1, 2 (2008), 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2008/02_economic_mobility_sawhill/02
_economic_mobility_sawhill.pdf. 
  Indeed, one study has found that the United States is somewhat 
 42. See id. 
 43. See, e.g., Isaacs et al., supra note 41; see also Bhashkar Mazumder, Fortunate Sons:  
New Estimates of Intergenerational Mobility in the United States Using Social Security 
Earnings Data, 87 REV. ECON. & STAT. 235 (2005); Gary Solon, Cross-Country Differences 
in Intergenerational Earnings Mobility, 16 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 59, 64 (2002). 
 44. See Julia B. Isaacs, Economic Mobility of Families Across Generations, in Isaacs et 
al., supra note 41, at 15, 19. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Julia B. Isaacs, International Comparisons of Economic Mobility, in Isaacs et al., 
supra note 41, at 37, 38–39. 
 47. Id. at 39. 
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exceptional in the low intergenerational mobility of those at the bottom of 
the economic ladder.48
Like memory of property, the phenomenon of property’s memory is, 
normatively speaking, a mixed bag.  On the one hand, the physical 
dimensions of memory in property constitute important mechanisms for 
preserving cultural knowledge.  In part, NAGPRA is rooted in a desire to 
honor the memory of property, however distant.  But it is also about the 
way property encodes cultural memory.  A world in which all chattels were 
physically destroyed (and recycled) every twenty years would be 
significantly impoverished by the loss of this physical channel of cultural 
transmission.  And memory in property provides a stability that lies near the 
heart of the benefits identified as flowing from private ownership more 
generally.  In addition, the inertia of land’s memory, while sometimes 
costly, slows down change in a way that can help us avoid a sense of 
constant dislocation and alienation. 
 
The costs of this physical memory are more elusive, at least for chattels.  
The problem of solid waste disposal may represent one such cost.  For land, 
however, the costs of property’s memory are more readily apparent.  The 
powerful path-dependence that land’s memory engenders makes it much 
more expensive—and sometimes practically impossible—to change 
direction when circumstances require it.  Land’s physical memory operates 
as a kind of dead hand control, with all the associated inefficiencies that can 
generate. 
The difficulty that shrinking cities like Detroit have in coordinating 
population loss in a way that maximizes the viability of the community as a 
whole is a testament to the power of land’s path-dependence.  Individual 
owners hold on tightly to their place, even in doomed neighborhoods that 
have long since surrendered their former vitality.49
 Actually carrying out [urban consolidation], particularly in a city as 
vast as Detroit, is like solving a complicated set of interwoven puzzles, as 
[city planners have] discovered over many long days and some nights 
poring over thousands of pages of maps and statistics . . . . 
  As the New York 
Times put it in a story about Detroit’s struggles with population loss: 
 How to reconfigure roads, bus lines, police districts?  How to 
encourage people—there is no power of eminent domain to force them—
to move out of the worst neighborhoods and into better ones?50
Significant benefits of the distributive memory embedded in property are 
harder to discern.  But there surely is some value to parents’ ability to 
 
 
 48. See Markus Jantti et al., American Exceptionalism in a New Light:  A Comparison of 
Intergenerational Earnings Mobility in the Nordic Countries, The United Kingdom and the 
United States (IZA, Discussion Paper No. 1938, 2006), available at 
http://ftp.iza.org/dp1938.pdf. 
 49. See Edward L. Glaeser, Shrinking Detroit Back to Greatness, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX 
(Mar. 16, 2010, 6:56 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/16/shrinking-detroit-
back-to-greatness/. 
 50. Monica Davey, An Odd Challenge for Planners:  How to Shrink a City, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 6, 2011, at A14. 
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transmit some of their relative advantages to their children.  The desire to 
transmit those advantages is likely a significant motivation for the 
productive effort of many parents.  And that desire arguably reflects (at 
least in part) the degree to which the successful transmission of advantage 
strengthens the bond between parents and children, which is valuable in its 
own right.  I do not want to be understood as claiming too much here.  My 
point is not that the ability to pass on advantage is necessary for parent-
child bonding, but some degree of transmission is doubtless helpful in 
fostering that connection. 
On the other side of the ledger, the costs of distributive memory are 
apparent.  Societies that ossify rigidly along class lines are both unfair and 
inefficient.  They reward the sloth of pampered heirs and fail to encourage 
productive behavior among those unlucky enough to be born at the bottom.  
As the Cuban Revolution shows, too much social stability can yield a great 
deal of resentment.  Excessive attempts to preserve social hierarchy are 
ultimately self-defeating.  The trick is to find a sweet spot between a total 
inability to give one’s children a leg up and the sort of perfect 
intergenerational transmission of advantage that locks a society into a rigid 
caste system. 
C.  Memory in Property and the Law 
Surveying the law of property, it is not too difficult to find doctrines that 
reflect a normative ambivalence about memory in property in both its 
individual and collective, distributive dimensions.  Sometimes, the law 
seems to embrace the path-dependence of memory in property.  Adverse 
possession and prescription, for example, favor continuity.  They ultimately 
grant the force of law to “facts on the ground,” provided that sufficient time 
has gone by, even (in many jurisdictions) when those facts were generated 
in bad faith by someone who knew he was acting with no legal right.51  
More dramatically—though without the tolerance of knowing violations—
the doctrine of relative hardship will allow someone who innocently 
improves the land of another to force a sale of the property where the cost 
of removing the improvement vastly exceeds the loss imposed on the actual 
landowner.52
 
 51. See Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, Facts on the Ground, in PROPERTY AND COMMUNITY 
107, 107 (Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver eds., 2010). 
  The doctrine’s ratification of recently created facts on the 
ground reinforces the operation of memory in property by, in effect, locking 
in physical transformations through the grant of immediate legal protection.  
Other doctrines that privilege existing land uses, ultimately strengthening 
the operation of memory in property, include the law of real covenants and 
equitable servitudes, which facilitate present owners’ efforts to lock in their 
vision of a parcel’s best use in ways that bind future owners.  Finally, there 
are the doctrines of vested rights and prior nonconforming uses, both of 
which protect land users from changes in the regime of land use regulation 
 52. See Proctor v. Huntington, 238 P.3d 1117 (Wash. 2010). 
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once they have gone far enough down a path of putting a land use into 
place.53
On the other hand, the law seems to acknowledge the potential dark side 
of memory in property by providing a number of tools for overcoming it.  
For land, the main legal mechanism for combating the path-dependency 
engendered by physical memory is the doctrine of eminent domain.  
Although recently the subject of some controversy, it has for thousands of 
years been understood to constitute an essential component of sovereign 
power.
 
54  By empowering the state to overcome individual landowners’ 
preferences, eminent domain reduces the costs that land’s memory would 
otherwise impose on the state’s efforts to achieve important public policy 
goals.  It is no surprise that eminent domain is frequently mentioned in 
connection with shrinking cities’ efforts to overcome resistant residents 
within dying neighborhoods.55  Servitudes doctrines—like “changed 
conditions,” which attempts to limit the enforcement of ancient covenants 
that seem to no longer serve a valuable purpose—similarly counteract the 
inertia of dead hand control through the law of servitudes.56
The most obvious common law doctrine for resisting property’s 
distributional memory is the rule against perpetuities.  To the extent that 
owners can use future interests and trust mechanisms in an effort to insulate 
their descendants from the consequences of their own improvidence, the 
rule puts a time limit on that protection, requiring dead hand control to 
expire within roughly two generations.
 
57
Estate and gift taxes constitute another set of legal tools for combating 
distributional memory embedded in property.  While permitting decedents 
to pass on significant quantities of property to the next generation, the estate 
tax dampens the ability of earlier distributions to reproduce themselves 
across generations.  The actual function of these laws nicely reflects the 
normative ambiguity of memory and property.  The law of succession 
freely permits owners to designate who will receive individual items of 
property they leave behind.  At the same time, it levies a tax—collected in 
the form of fungible money—on the total market value of the estate 
conveyed.
 
58
III.  TINKERING WITH THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LAW AND MEMORY 
 
A. Adverse Possession 
Adverse possession law has existed in some form in the Anglo-American 
common law for nearly a thousand years.59
 
 53. See SINGER, supra note 
  The law shifts title to a parcel 
21, at 645–47, 650–51. 
 54. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS:  PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN 8–18 (1985). 
 55. See Glaeser, supra note 49. 
 56. See SINGER, supra note 21, at 288–91. 
 57. See id. at 328. 
 58. See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 845–49 (7th ed. 2005). 
 59. See SINGER, supra note 21, at 140. 
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of land to an occupant who has possessed the land “openly and notoriously” 
for some period of time (under modern statutes, typically seven to ten 
years).60
In recent years, however, individual cases of successful adverse 
possession have generated negative public reactions.
  For most of the doctrine’s history, and in most jurisdictions today, 
the law has not inquired into the state of mind of the adverse possessor by 
asking, for example, whether the adverse possessor believed she actually 
owned the land when she entered.  Rather, it has looked to the nature of the 
adverse possessor’s occupancy.  If the adverse possessor has used and 
occupied the land as a typical owner would for a long enough period of 
time, she has typically prevailed against the title owner. 
61  Much of that 
reaction has been framed in terms of the doctrine’s tendency to violate, or 
reward the violation of, property rights.  In at least two states, New York 
and Colorado, legislatures have responded by trying to make it more 
difficult—and, in New York’s case, perhaps impossible—to adversely 
possess land you know to belong to someone else, or even land you believe 
that you own where you lack an “objectively reasonable basis” for that 
belief.62
B.  The Rule Against Perpetuities and Estate Taxation 
  The New York law in particular puts a heavy thumb on the scale 
of distant memories of property in a way that arguably upsets the careful 
balance struck by adverse possession law. 
The federal estate tax was created in 1916.63  After allowing for a very 
significant deduction, thereby ensuring that it touches only a small number 
of (indeed, the very few largest) estates, it imposes a tax on transfers of 
property occurring at death, either formally or substantively.  The use of life 
estates strung end to end offers a potential mechanism for avoiding the 
estate tax, but the rule against perpetuities prevents this form of tax 
avoidance from extending more than two generations or so into the future.64  
Nevertheless, in order to prevent the circumvention of the estate tax through 
the use of life estates, Congress enacted a “generation-skipping transfer tax” 
in 1986.65
As I observed above, taxes on wealth transfers between generations 
constitute an important tool in the effort to limit the reach of property’s 
distributive memory.  Obviously, this policy of limiting the persistence of 
present distributions is not appealing to many of those who hold large 
concentrations of wealth.
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 60. See id. at 143–55. 
  For many years, the wealthy—and those 
 61. See, e.g., Jeanette Torres, Texas Man Gets Mansion for $16 with Adverse Possession 
Law, ABC NEWS RADIO (July 19, 2011), http://abcnewsradioonline.com/business-
news/texas-man-gets-mansion-for-16-with-adverse-possession-law.html. 
 62. See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW. § 501 (McKinney 2009) (amended in 2008). 
 63. See Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50 UCLA 
L. REV. 1303, 1312 (2003). 
 64. See id. 
 65. See I.R.C. § 2612 (2006); Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 63, at 1312. 
 66. But see WILLIAM H. GATES SR. & CHUCK COLLINS, WEALTH AND OUR 
COMMONWEALTH:  WHY AMERICA SHOULD TAX ACCUMULATED FORTUNES (2002). 
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ideologically opposed to redistribution—have waged a multipronged attack 
against both the rule against perpetuities and the estate tax.  Since the late 
1980s, nearly half the states have abolished or virtually eliminated the rule 
against perpetuities for trusts, creating the possibility of perpetual or 
dynastic trusts that can escape the reach of both the estate tax and the 
generation-skipping transfer tax.67  In addition, Congress has repeatedly 
increased the estate tax deduction and lowered the rate of estate taxation, 
and the permanent abolition of the estate tax remains a major goal of 
congressional Republicans.68
CONCLUSION 
  The combined effect of these policies is to 
make it easier for concentrated wealth to reproduce itself across 
generations, dramatically enhancing the “memory” of existing property 
distributions. 
I began with the story of my grandmother’s memory of lost property.  I 
will close with another story about memory and its dangers.  In Funes el 
Memorioso,69 Jorge Luis Borges tells the (fictional) story of a young man 
with a perfect photographic memory.  Borges describes how Funes passes 
his time—reliving the perfect memory of past days and creating a system of 
counting in which each number has a unique, frivolous name (“Instead of 
seven thousand thirteen (7013), he would say, for instance ‘Máximo 
Pérez’ . . . .”).70  Borges recognized the danger of never forgetting:  
“[Funes] had effortlessly learned English, French, Portuguese, Latin.  I 
suspect, nevertheless, that he was not very good at thinking.  To think is to 
ignore (or forget) differences, to generalize, to abstract.  In the teeming 
world of Ireneo Funes there was nothing but particulars—and they were 
virtually immediate particulars.”71
Unlimited memory is no less dangerous to a system of property than it is 
to an individual’s ability to think.  What is striking about the recent reforms 
of adverse possession, the rule against perpetuities, and the estate tax is 
their supporters’ apparent disregard of the costs of overprotecting memories 
of property and memories in property.  The common law’s more measured 
approach seems implicitly to recognize the need to balance memory against 
possession, stability against fluidity.  The recognition that ratifying 
property’s memories generates both costs and benefits does not counsel 
decisively against the wisdom of modifying the law of adverse possession 
or abolishing the rule against perpetuities, but it does cast doubt on the one-
sided approach of the proponents of these measures.  In the law of property, 
memory is not an unmitigated good. 
 
 
 67. See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 63, at 1313–15. 
 68. See, e.g., Albert R. Hunt, Op.-Ed., Republicans’ Ideology Dooms Deal on U.S. Debt, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/18/us/18iht-letter18.html. 
 69. Translated literally:  “Funes the Memorious.” 
 70. JORGE LUIS BORGES, Funes, His Great Memory, in COLLECTED FICTIONS 131, 136 
(Andrew Hurley trans., 1998). 
 71. Id. at 137. 
1088 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
The stability of property entitlements fosters and is in turn reinforced by 
memory.  The common law of property takes a mixed view of this 
phenomenon.  When confronted with conflicting claims concerning 
memories of property, the law initially favors the memories of past 
possessors, but eventually shifts its loyalties toward present possessors.  
Similarly, the law facilitates the use of property forms to embed individual 
and distributive memory within property, but it has also traditionally 
imposed limits on those efforts, through numerous doctrines meant to 
weaken the grip of dead hand control.  The law’s ambivalence towards the 
claims of memory sounds a useful cautionary note in the midst of present 
efforts to dismantle many of the obstacles the law of property has 
traditionally placed in the way of the claims of memory. 
 
